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This paper examines theoretically, using a two-country real-business-cycle model,
the eﬀects of capital-market liberalization when there is limited participation in na-
tional ﬁnancial markets. It is assumed that workers cannot smooth consumption as well
as do stockholders, and therefore, liberalization may hurt workers. This dynamic model
evaluates some claims–made particularly by the "anti-globalization" movement–that
capital movements hurt workers, while beneﬁtting stockholders. Quantitatively, liber-
alization makes workers better oﬀ in the long run, since the new capital allocation
and increased insurance foster capital accumulation, raising wages that oﬀset the out-
put ﬂuctuations due to capital ﬂows. However, transitional eﬀects may overturn these
long-run beneﬁts.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, many nations began implementing a wave of economic
reforms. Among those reforms was capital account liberalization. As a result, today inter-
national ﬁnancial markets are substantially more active than twenty years ago, though there
are still many countries with various sorts of capital controls. Economic theory predicts
that a complete opening of all ﬁnancial markets should be welfare-improving: intertemporal
consumption smoothing, consumption insurance, and better allocation of investment across
countries would presumably all contribute their share to this. However, it is not clear what
eﬀect partial liberalization, or liberalization in the presence of other frictions that cannot be
eliminated, would have. In this case Pareto improvements are not guaranteed, and at the
very least some groups may lose from liberalization while others gain. A complete account
of the actual experience from past liberalizations is yet to be made; see, for example, the
survey of empirical research by Das and Mohapatra (2003). The purpose of this paper, how-
ever, is theoretical, studying the eﬀects of capital account liberalization in conjunction with
a particular friction: limited participation in the stock market. In other words, in this paper
it is studied whether the fact that some nationals do not have access to stock markets could
limit the beneﬁts of international liberalization, whether in size or in the diﬀerential impact
across groups in society.
The group that does not participate in national stock markets (prior to and after liber-
alization) is a particularly interesting one to study. The presumption here is that consumers
with little wealth, referred to as “workers” here, are very inactive in intertemporal as well as
in insurance markets. Thus, would those consumers lose from liberalization? In particular,
would they suﬀer from increased movement of capital across borders, which might lead to a
large increase in wage volatility and perhaps job insecurity? Some observers stress this as a
real possibility. In the debate, there has been an increasing and signiﬁcant movement against
“globalization.” Part of the target of this movement is the liberalization of capital markets,
2and one of the arguments put forth (though not the only one) is based on a concern that
inequality will rise. Thus, the “anti-globalization” movement claims that the presumable
beneﬁts of the eﬃcient allocation of capital throughout the world that comes with stock
market liberalization favor only stockholders and not workers. Capital liberalization may
lead to higher capital supply elasticities, aﬀecting the welfare of those workers with limited
mobility. The approach taken in this paper allows us to study those possibly asymmetric
eﬀects theoretically using standard macroeconomic theory extended to allow inequality. In
particular, inequality is a function of the institutional scheme adopted in this model, since
wages and returns to capital are endogenous and have an important inﬂuence on the distrib-
ution of wealth and welfare across individuals within a country (in addition to their possibly
asymmetric eﬀects on individuals in diﬀerent countries).
There is plenty of microeconomic evidence of heterogeneity among households in terms
of how their ﬁnancial wealth is allocated. In particular, a very striking pattern in household
survey data is that only a small fraction of households own stocks. Among workers, moreover,
as i g n i ﬁcant fraction holds only liquid assets. Thus, an argument can be made that–at
least as a rough approximation–those households can be described as “hand-to-mouth”
consumers: they consume their labor income as it arrives and keep bank depositsonly to
facilitate the spending of that income.
There are also arguments from the theoretical literature on macroeconomics and inequal-
ity that suggest that one should in fact expect this kind of characterization of ﬁnancial
inequality across households. In particular, several one-country models of inequality lead
to endogenous splits of the population into two groups: the high-wealth consumers, who
are active stockholders and whose savings behavior is key in determining interest rates, and
low-wealth consumers who are essentially passive ﬁnancially. The model of Krusell and
Smith (1998) derives those results based on assumptions of heterogeneity in time discount
rates, and Guvenen (2003) studies a two-group model where the diﬀerence among agents
3has its roots in risk attitudes and the intertemporal substitution elasticity.1 The model here
departs from those papers: it assumes that there are two groups of agents–“workers” and
“stockholders”–and it assumes limited participation of an extreme form: workers are simply
hand-to-mouth consumers. The presumption is that a model based on incomplete insurance
against idiosyncratic income risks along with preference heterogeneity, like a combination of
the frameworks studied by Krusell and Smith and by Guvenen, would deliver a setup with
an “almost-reduced” form like the model studied here.
In order to focus on the redistribution eﬀects of international portfolio diversiﬁcation,
the focus on two groups greatly simpliﬁes the analysis both numerically and analytically.
In particular, it is possible to ﬁnd closed-form solutions under the parameterizations as-
sumed. Thus, the model is considerably more tractable than the frameworks studied in
the incomplete-markets literature, while still capturing the essential features of those much
more complex models. Thus, there are two countries and two types of agents in each country.
Countries face country-speciﬁc technological shocks as in a standard two-country stochastic
neoclassical growth model. Workers (low-wealth agents) do not have access to the stock
market, while stockholders (high-wealth agents) do. Adjustments in the labor market occur
only through a price dimension, e.g., movements in wages, while the adjustments through
quantities, either in the intensive or in the extensive margin are not possible since labor sup-
ply is inelastic. Even though in principle adjustments through quantities may be important,
Albuquerque and Rebelo (2000) provide an ample survey of literature that suggests a small
impact in labor markets associated with many trade reforms.
The model can be solved for two institutional arrangements. In the ﬁrst arrangement
stockholders can buy contingent claims for every possible state of the world from an invest-
ment fund, and it is this ﬁrm that decides how to allocate the collected funds between the
1Guvenen assumes limited participation but discusses how it would arise endogenously under ﬁxed costs
of participation. Krusell and Smith do not assume or derive limited participation but show how the portfolios
of the wealthy will be more geared toward stock.
4two technologies available in the world so as to maximize proﬁts. In this setup, we would
discuss stock prices and stock-market liberalizations. In the second arrangement, stockhold-
ers in each country accumulate capital as wealth, thus directly deciding how much capital
to invest in each country. Here,we could use the cost of capital in the two countries as the
relevant prices and the label foreign direct investment (FDI) would become appropriate. As
expected, the equilibria of both models coincide, although the shape of the decision rules
diﬀers. The second arrangement is presented in this paper.
Leaving aside preference heterogeneity, countries in this model can be diﬀerent in three
ways: ﬁrst, their average productivity can diﬀer; second, even if their average productivity is
the same, their volatilities do not need to be identical; and third, there can be diﬀerences in
the abundance of inputs. One of the goals of the paper is to examine how those asymmetric
distributions of primitives inﬂuence the outcomes for observables and for the economic welfare
of diﬀerent consumers. Moreover, the transition to steady state needs to be taken into
account, so initial conditions–the initial relative capital stocks and productivity levels–can
be important in determining outcomes.
The most striking result I have found is that of steady-state comparisons: it turns out
that for a wide range of parameters, world workers actually beneﬁt from capital account
liberalization policies. This occurs because world wealth increases in the open economy and
so does the capital invested in every country. The two key ingredients for this result are
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of the stockholders’ utility function is
equal to 1 and the concavity of the production functions. Empirical studies suggest that the
IES for stockholders is close to 1, while the IES for workers is lower (around 0.1)2.T h u s ,t h e
increase in the overall capital stock outweighs the potential losses from increased ﬂuctuations
in wages.
Another interesting result is that transition eﬀects indeed can be quite important quan-
titatively. In the welfare comparisons it is thus possible that the positive long-run eﬀects of
2See Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002) and Vissing-Jorgensen (2001).
5liberalization can be reversed: workers in one of the countries involved in the liberalization
process may, for some initial conditions, be worse oﬀ. In those cases, thus, the gains in the
long run are not suﬃcient to outweigh the losses in the near future due to the adjustment
in capital ﬂows.
I also calibrate the economy and compare the results obtained with those in related
representative-agent two-country models. For the logarithmic-utility case, and given the
closed-form nature of the results, it is straightforward to compare both steady states and
transition paths with and without capital account liberalization.
The previous literature has studied the welfare gains from international risk sharing un-
der a representative-agent assumption with output uncertainty. Cole and Obstfeld (1991)
calibrate a model using U.S. and Japanese data and ﬁnd very small gains from asset trade
because relative price movements across diﬀerent consumption goods induce insurance in-
directly. Moreover, their results are in line with the ﬁndings in Lucas (1987), who esti-
mates the cost of postwar United States consumption variability to be quite small. Obstfeld
(1994) obtains much larger welfare gains than Lucas does using a model with endogenous
growth. However, the empirical evidence suggests that stock-market liberalizations lead
to important transitory growth eﬀect without much inﬂuencing long-run growth outcomes
(Fuchs-Schundeln and Funke (2001)). Finally, a model with heterogeneous agents of the
type considered here is studied by van Wincoop (1996), but the purpose of his analysis is
unrelated to the questions asked in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. First a simple ﬁnite-horizon model with uncertainty
is analized, and for illustration the focus is on perfect negative correlation between the
technology shocks of the two countries. Subsequently, the inﬁnite-horizon problem under
incomplete markets arrangements is described, together with some comparative-static ex-
periments. Finally, to measure the importance of the diﬀerent eﬀects that come into play
during the capital liberalization process the US and Korean economy are calibrated . The
last section concludes and suggests some extensions.
62 Finite-horizon models
2.1 Uncertainty with negatively and perfectly correlated shocks
The simplest but still interesting economy to study is described by a model with two coun-
tries that only lasts for two periods where shocks are negatively and perfectly correlated.
The technological shocks today are indicated by A and A∗ in each country while tomorrow
there will be A  and A∗  (asterisks denote the foreign country variables and primes denote
tomorrow’s variables).
For the sake of simplicity, I borrow the underlying one-country model from Krusell (2002).
Each country is populated by a large number of identical stockholders with measure µ
(µ∗) for the home (foreign) country, normalized to 1 for convenience, and a large number of
identical workers with measures n and n∗respectively. Stockholders from the same country
have identical wealth, not necessarily equal to that of stockholders in the other country. All
agents in both economies have identical tastes.
In this two-period model, countries do not know if tomorrow their productivity shock will
be high or low, but they do know that the correlation between the shocks of the two countries
is minus one. Since I want to focus on the eﬀects of uncertainty and risk sharing between
the diﬀerent groups of agents in the two countries, it will be assumed that the countries have
the same initial wealth, the same participation rates (or factor abundance) and equal levels
of the productivity shocks (i.e. Ah = A∗
h,a n dAl = A∗
l).
It is worth noticing that in this case with uncertainty, the eﬀects that opening stock
markets internationally have on the groups non participating in them, this is, the workers,
are diﬀerent depending on the speciﬁcv a l u eo ft h eI E Sc o e ﬃcient of the stockholders’ utility
function.
Again, the problem is solved for the simplest case with IES=1 (logarithmic utility).










taking R  as given. R  now can take two values, R 
h and R 
l.
kd is today’s stock of capital of the representative domestic stockholder invested in the
home country, and R is the rate of return of capital in the home country.








































with A  taking values Ah or Al.
cw
d is today’s consumption of the domestic worker which equates the return of labor in
t h eh o m ec o u n t r y .
T h ep r o b l e mi ss y m m e t r i cf o rt h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y .
When capital mobility is allowed, stockholders from any of the two countries can invest
in two assets so their set of portfolio choices is larger. For the domestic stockholders the
















with prices R  and R∗  taken as given.
In equilibrium, domestic stockholders allocate half of their savings in every country be-






























but their total savings do not change. Therefore consumption of stockholders in the ﬁrst
period does not change relative to the autarky case. However consumption in the second
period does. Since shocks are perfectly and negatively correlated, stockholders are able
to fully insure. Thus they are clearly better oﬀ with the liberalization of capital markets.
Workers’ consumption in the ﬁrst period is given by initial conditions, and those do not
change either in autarky or in the capital liberalization case. Workers’ consumption in
the second period is given by their country’s speciﬁc shock (as before) and by the capital
invested in the country in which they live. Even though stockholders diversify their portfolio
investing half of their savings in each country, what matters for workers is the evolution of
total savings, speciﬁcally how much of the total savings is invested in their country. Since
the problem is completely symmetric, looking at total savings is suﬃcient to know how much
c a p i t a li si n v e s t e di ne a c hc o u n t r y .
How total savings evolve is given by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of stock-
holders. As mention before empirical evidence suggests that stockholders have an IES around
91, so that the logarithmic utility for stockholders that we analize would be consistent with
the data.
For the logarithmic-utility case, total savings do not change since stockholders save a
proportion of their wealth that does not depend on the expected return. In this case neither
will consumption of the workers in the second period, making them indiﬀerent between
capital autarky or capital mobility. The fact that workers’ welfare is unaﬀected by the
liberalization of capital markets in this dynamic two-period model may be misleading if one
stopped here, since the inclusion of extra periods will break this result. Here is the intuition:
when including an extra period, the beneﬁts from smoothing that stockholders enjoy will
start to leak to workers. Even if they do not participate in the stock market, workers dislike
volatility too (concave utility). Their labor income volatility depends on two factors, one
is their country speciﬁc shock, and the other is the capital invested in their countries. The
former does not change since they cannot save or migrate, but the latter can change through
stockholders’ optimal saving decisions. In the three period model with capital mobility, the
expected income received by stockholders does not depend on the states of the technology
shocks in the second period (thanks to diversiﬁcation), which means that neither will their
future savings. Moreover, and this is speciﬁc to the logarithmic utility, since stockholders
total savings today do not depend on tomorrow’s expected return, stockholders’ asset income
tomorrow will increase (they save the same amount of capital, but the availability of the new
asset increases the expected return). In the two-period model, only stockholders enjoy this
increase in their asset income, consuming all the increase in the second and last period.
With three periods, and given that they save a constant proportion of their income, workers
will also beneﬁt from the increase in stockholders’ asset income in the second period, since
this means a higher level of capital in the third period. Workers’ wages are increasing in
capital. Therefore workers’ consumption grows in the third period, making expected utility
of workers higher with capital mobility than without it.
When the IES for stockholders is larger than 1, the liberalization of the capital account
10induces stockholders to save more than before, so that workers’ consumption increases in the
second period too. In this case, workers’ welfare increases both in the two-period and in the
three-period model compared to the capital autarky environment.
When the IES for stockholders is smaller than 1, the liberalization of the capital account
induces stockholders to save less, so workers’ consumption decreases in the second period,
making workers’ welfare fall in the two-period model. The inclusion of a third period will
compensate workers for the loss of consumption in the second period, at least partially,
through the decrease in the volatility of the capital investment as explained above, and
therefore the decrease in the volatility of workers wages.
Proposition 1 When countries are totally symmetric and productivity shocks are perfectly
and negatively correlated, an elasticity of intertemporal substitution for stockholders larger
than or equal to one increases world savings under capital market liberalization, and makes
all agents better oﬀ.
3T h e i n ﬁnite-horizon model
3.1 Incomplete markets for stockholders
As before, stockholders maximize their lifetime utility. In order to do so, they can accumulate
physical capital. They do not work, so that they only receive capital income and leisure is
not valued. In autarky, a stockholder can only invest in his own country’s capital. The








ccap,t + kt+1 = Rtkt ∀t.
11As in the previous subsection, each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically and
consumes his labor income every period.
Both prices, Rt and wt equal the marginal productivities of their corresponding factors.
The only source of heterogeneity within a country is between those two types of agents.
In the home country, there is a measure µ =1of identical stockholders, and a measure n of
identical workers.
3.1.1 Recursive formulation for a stockholder in the open economy
To keep the model manageable, only two types of stockholders are allowed, the ones from the
home country and the ones from the foreign country. Within each country, all stockholders
have the same wealth. However the wealth between countries does not have to be the same.
The problem of a stockholder with wealth ωκ ,i naw o r l dw i t hw e a l t hωt , and home and
























































κ :w e a l t ho fs t o c k h o l d e rκ tomorrow.
ω 
t : total or aggregate tomorrow’s wealth, this is, wealth of the domestic and foreign
stockholders tomorrow.
kκ : today’s stock of capital invested in the home country that belongs to stockholder κ.
k∗
κ : today’s stock of capital invested in the foreign country that belongs to stockholder
κ.
k and n are aggregate capital and labor in the home country.
k
∗
and n∗ are aggregate capital and labor in the foreign country.
3.1.2 Closed-form solutions
In this setup, every-period stockholders’ total saving is a percentage β of their wealth. The
way they allocate their savings among the two technologies matters not only for them but
also for the workers in both economies since the labor income they receive depends on the
aggregate capital invested only in the country in which they live and work.
Let’s call λij the proportion of wealth invested in capital in the home country when
shocks today are (Ai,A ∗
j) ;t h e n(β − λij) i st h ep r o p o r t i o no fw e a l t hi n v e s t e di nc a p i t a li n
t h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r yf o rt h es a m ec a s e .T h eo p t i m a lv a l u e sf o rλij depend on the primitives
of the economy such as the values of the technological shocks as well as the transition
probabilities of those processes, the factor shares between capital and labor, the discount
factor of the agents and the labor supplies in each country.
The policy functions for a stockholder of wealth ω are:
k
  = gij(ω)=λijω
k
∗  = g
∗
ij(ω)=( β − λij)ω.
Therefore tomorrow aggregates in each country are k
 
= λijωt and k
∗ 
=( β − λij)ωt
respectively.
13The value function for a stockholder with wealth ω,i naw o r l dw i t hat o t a lw e a l t ho fωt
when the shocks today are (Ai,A ∗
j) c a nb ew r i t t e na s :
V (Ai,A
∗
j,ω,ωt)=aij + bij log(ω)+cij log(ωt),
where aij,b ij and cij are constants that depend on the parameters of the two economies.
The value function for a worker living in country d with country wealth being ωd,i na




j,ωd,ωt)=  aij +  bij log(ωd)+  cij log(ωt),
where   aij,  bij and   cij are constants that depend on the parameters of the two economies.
Notice that for a worker the relevant variables are the worldwide wealth and the wealth
o ft h ec o u n t r yi nw h i c hh eo rs h el i v e s . T h ew o r k e r sd on o tc a r ew h oi st h eo w n e ro ft h e
capital invested in their country, but only how much capital is invested.
4 The i.i.d. case
Before doing any serious calibration, it is worth exploring the simple case in which shocks
are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) across time and across countries, where
persistence is not an issue and the equations of the problem are greatly simpliﬁed.
Because the two country technological processes are i.i.d., it is proved in the appendix
that the proportion of wealth that stockholders invest in each stock does not depend on the
current world shocks (Ai,A ∗
j). Therefore λij = λ and (β − λij)=λ
∗ ∀ij.
To heighten understanding the model, I analyze separately for the four types of agents
in the global economy the eﬀects on quantities and prices of three possible sources of het-
erogeneity between two countries that allow for international asset trade.
14In this section, a steady state analysis is described, that is, a description of the changes
in prices and quantities in the ergodic set moving from a world composed of two closed
economies to an integrated (costless asset trade for stockholders) economy is provided. The
results shown are computed for the case where the intertemporal substitution for the workers
is 1. However, the conclusions are the same when the intertemporal substitution of workers
is 0.13. Notice that in order to measure the steady state welfare of the agents in the closed
economies, initial conditions of wealth do not matter. However, the same is not true for
the asset-integrated world economy; actually the changes in stockholders’ welfare in the
world with capital mobility depend greatly on the relative initial wealth between the two
stockholders.
4.1 Comparative statics in the steady states
4.1.1 Diﬀerences in volatility
Imagine that Home and Foreign countries are about to open their stock markets between
their national stockholders, and assume that the volatility of the productivity shocks diﬀers
between the Home and Foreign countries. How is redistribution among the agents in the
world economy aﬀected by this volatility? When should we expect larger movements in
prices or capital ﬂows? Those are the questions this section answers.
As earlier emphasized, even to compute welfare in the steady state, initial conditions
matters. What matters exactly is the starting relative wealth between the representative
stockholders of the two countries. Start by considering the most symmetric case where this
relative wealth is 1.
All the following graphs should be read vertically. Points in a vertical line reﬂect the
diﬀerent levels of the variable indicated in the closed economy steady state and in the free
capital mobility steady state for the same set of parameters.
3Details available upon request.
15The standard deviation of shocks in Home country is kept equal to 10% during the
experiment, while the standard deviation of the foreign shocks varies as indicated by the
graphs.
The ﬁrst noticeable pattern that can be observed in Figure 2 is that workers in both
countries are better oﬀ with the international opening of the stock markets. Even though the
volatility of their labor income may increase or decrease compared to the closed economy level
(Figure 4), global wealth always increases in the open world. Moreover the capital invested in
each country also rises, slightly increasing wages (or workers’ consumption) in both countries,
although more pronouncely in the domestic (relatively low-risk) country, and making all
workers better oﬀ. For domestic workers, only the capital income obtained for the use of
the domestic technology is important, and when the economy is in asset autarky, aggregate
capital income coincides with aggregate income of the domestic stockholders. However, when
international portfolio diversiﬁcation is allowed, this two aggregates do not need to coincide
since then, stockholders can invest in another country as well; this is why the movements
in consumption for stockholders and workers of the same country do not need to go in the
same direction when the economy is open.
To understand Figure 1 remember that home and foreign stockholders’ welfare are dif-
ferent in autarky because the volatility of their countries-productive shocks are diﬀerent
(always 10% for the home country, and a range of levels for the foreign country), but once
that capital markets open internationally and given that they start with the same wealth,
their level of welfare in the new open steady state will be the same for both. For the stock-
holders, there is an area in Figure 1, where volatilities of the two countries are relatively
close, in which both are better oﬀ in the open economy. However, when the volatilities of
technology shocks are very diﬀerent between the two countries, there is redistribution from
stockholders of the low volatility country to those in the large volatility country. The former
are worse oﬀ and the latter are better oﬀ in the open economy. The intuition for this result
is simple; when the two assets are relatively similar, the gains from diversifying for both
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Home and foreign stockholders in the open economies 
Figure 1: Welfare of stockholders
stockholders compensate for the eﬀects that opening the market for capital have on prices;
however when the volatility of the two assets is quite diﬀerent, the eﬀect on prices (return
to capital) for the stockholder of the relatively low volatility country is such that his or her
wealth decreases and so does consumption in the ergodic set.
Another prediction of the model is that the larger the global volatility of the technology
processes, the larger the fall in the cost of capital will be in both countries in the aftermath
of the capital liberalization (graph not shown).
In this symmetric case, even though for some of the parameterizations of the model some
stockholders may lose welfare in the open economy ergodic set, there are global welfare gains
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Figure 2: Welfare of workers
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Figure 3: Volatility of stockholders’ consumption
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Foreign workers in the open economies
Figure 4: Volatility of workers’ consumption
20from opening the stock markets internationally.
To study the eﬀects of the initial conditions in the steady state welfare, the model has
been simulated for the same value of the parameters as above, but with a starting relative
wealth between the home and the foreign stockholder equal to two. That is, the initial wealth
of the home stockholder is twice that of the foreign stockholder. This could be thought as
if the home country is ahead in its transition path towards the steady state when the stock
market opens internationally.
In this case, the predictions of prices and workers’ welfare of both countries are similar
to the ones obtained in the symmetric case above. However, the relative initial wealth
proves powerful in determining the stockholders’ welfare changes from opening the capital
markets. For the case studied, the wealthy stockholder always gains from having access to
the foreign technology no matter how volatile it is. Meanwhile the opposite happens for the
poor stockholder.
In this non symmetric case, the loss in the poor stockholders’ welfare in the open econ-
omy is large enough that there are global welfare losses from opening the stock markets
internationally. This is due to the concavity of the utility functions.
4.1.2 Diﬀerences in factor abundance
In the previous experiment, for all the cases analyzed, the measure of stockholders in both
countries was the same (it was 1 in each country), as was the measure of workers (four in
each country). This section examines what happens when the measure of foreign workers
changes holding everything else constant. Notice that this changes both the population size
as well as the participation rate in the stock market of the foreingn country.
As before, initial conditions matter, so again the most symmetric case in which the
starting relative wealth is 1 is considered.
For the range of parameters analized, Figure 6 illustrates that workers in both countries
21are better oﬀ with the international opening of the stock markets irrespective of the changes
in the volatility of their labor income relative to their closed economy level (Figures 7 and
8). Global wealth remains unchanged or slightly increases in the open world, and so does
the wealth invested in every country, increasing wages in both countries to a small extent
and making all workers better oﬀ. Notice however that if the diﬀerence between the measure
of workers between the two countries was large enough, some workers (the ones in the more
populated country) could be worse oﬀ with the liberalization.
For the stockholders, and taking into account that now the risky technological shocks are
identical in both countries, there does not exist an area as before, where both stockholders
are better oﬀ in the open economy (Figure 5). Here there is always redistribution from
stockholders of the labor-abundant country to those in the labor-scarce country such that
t h ef o r m e ra r ew o r s eo ﬀ and the latter are better oﬀ in the open economy.
The intuition for this result is simple; since return of capital is increasing on labor,
capital liberalization makes stockholders of the labor-abundant country share their abundant
resources with the new comers without the same advantages in return.
The cost of capital falls in both countries, due to the increase in the world’s wealth, as
well as the amount of capital invested in each country. Besides, the cost of capital falls more
in the smaller country.
In this symmetric case, and spite of the fact that some stockholders may lose welfare in
the open economy while others win, there are global welfare gains from opening the stock
markets internationally.
As before, initial conditions are very important at determining the stockholders’ welfare
changes from opening the capital markets, but they are not for workers in either country.
The graphs above show the steady state comparisons for the case in which both stockholders
start with the same wealth.
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Figure 5: Welfare of stockholders
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Figure 6: Welfare of workers
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Figure 7: Volatility of stockholders’ consumption
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Figure 8: Volatility of workers’ consumption
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Figure 9: Welfare of stockholders
4.1.3 Diﬀerences in productivity
This section studies what happens when a country opens trade in assets with another country
with a diﬀerent level of productivity. That is, here the problem is solved for diﬀerent levels
of foreign productivity (assuming that foreign volatility is zero), and leaving the rest of the
parameters of the model unchanged.
As in the previous two cases, initial conditions matter, so again consider the case where
the starting relative wealth between the two stockholders is 1.
Figure 10 shows that workers in both countries are basically unaﬀected by the interna-
tional opening of the stock markets irrespective of the changes in the volatility of their labor
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Figure 10: Welfare of workers
income compared to their closed economy level (Figures 11 and 12). Global wealth remains
practically unchanged in the open world, and so does the wealth invested in every country.
For the stockholders, and taking into account that the standard deviation of the home
process is 10% and that of the foreign process is always zero, there does not exist an area
where both stockholders are better oﬀ in the open economy (Figure 9). Whenever the
foreign productivity is larger than the average home productivity and asset markets open
internationally, there is redistribution from foreign stockholders to home stockholders. The
intuition is that when opening the market for capital, the stockholders in the country with
higher productivity have to share the beneﬁts of the previously exclusive technology with the
rest of the world’s stockholders. This reduces their wealth and therefore their consumption;
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Foreign stockholders in autarky
Home and foreing stockholders in the open economies 
Figure 11: Volatility of stockholders’ consumption
and the opposite occurs for the stockholders in the relatively low productive country.
As in the other cases studied, the cost of capital falls in both countries, decreasing
relatively more in the less productive country.
In this symmetric case, and in spite of the fact that some stockholders may lose welfare
in the open economy while others win, there are global welfare gains (although very small)
from opening the stock markets internationally.
Summarizing what can be learned about long-run outcomes from studying the diﬀerent
sources of heterogeneity, one striking result is clear. Workers tend to beneﬁt from liberalizing
capital markets, at least in the long run, and this occurs even though they do not participate
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Figure 12: Volatility of workers’ consumption
30directly in capital markets. This result is robust to diﬀerent starting conditions between the
national stockholders of the two countries in the model.
In the simulations done so far, spillovers between the technologies of the two countries
have not been considered, and the inclusion of them might change the results discussed
above. Also, this is a model of rational agents, so I am excluding contagion episodes, usually
related with irrational behavior, which some may argue are an important source of changes
in the volatility of capital ﬂows and therefore of welfare changes. In defense of the model
though, we have seen that opening capital accounts does bring changes in the volatility
workers in diﬀerent countries face, but those changes come from rational decisions and do
not contradict the fact the workers are still better oﬀ with them. Thus the general idea
proclaimed by the anti-globalization movement that workers must lose with capital account
liberalizations does not hold up, at least under a long-run perspective.
In all the results shown above, a logarithmic utility function has been assumed for both
workers and stockholders, and although this is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings that
say the IES for stockholders is around 1, the IES for workers is much lower than 1, around
0.1. (For a deeper discussion about the diﬀerent IES between stockholders and workers see
Guvenen (2003)). Even though workers do not save in this model, a low EIS means that
workers would like to smooth consumption even more than stockholders, so the increase in
wealth caused by the capital liberalization will be even more appreciated, making the steady
state results robust to this change in workers’ utility.
4.2 Comparative statics including the transition path
Looking only at steady state welfare comparisons is useful because it allows us to think in
the long run. However it excludes the adjustments and mechanisms that led us there in the
ﬁrst place. Moreover, the welfare variations during the transition may be such that they can
reverse the sign of the welfare changes when only considering the steady states.
31Throughout this paper, only unanticipated capital account liberalizations have been con-
sidered. If agents were able to anticipate capital liberalizations, they might change their
saving behavior before the actual liberalization takes place, so some eﬀects would be missing
in the present analysis.
For all the cases studied above, it is useful to think in the following terms: in the long
run world wealth rises even when the production functions of the two countries diﬀer and
world wealth is not allocated equally between them. The amount of capital invested in every
country is larger than it would have been, had the capital markets remained closed. In the
short run however, diﬀerences in the production functions between the two countries matter
more, as in the two-period model without uncertainty described in section 2.1. If the return
to capital diﬀers between countries in autarky, capital will ﬂow from one country to the
other to bring together the expected returns to capital invested in each country. Thus the
workers living in the country whose return was low in autarky will suﬀer since capital will
ﬂow out in the short run and their wage and consumption will fall. If there are costs to
adjusting capital, the ﬂow of capital from the low-return country to the high-return country
will be gradual, and so will the adjustmnet in workers’wages and consumption. But losses
to workers’ welfare could still be signiﬁcant. For suﬃcient diﬀerences between the returns
to capital in the two countries in autarky, the decrease in the short-run consumption for
the workers in the low-return country will be such that the short-run loss in welfare could
outweigh the long-run beneﬁts from opening stock markets.
As shown below, even small diﬀerences in the technological processes between the two
countries may cause suﬃcient losses during the transition path for the workers in the low-
return country such that the total change in welfare for them of liberalizing stock markets
could be negative. This result has two clear implications. If we think of the autarkic low-
return country as a rich or developed country, and the autarkic high-return country as a
developing country, capital liberalization could lead to an increase in income inequality in
the rich country and a decrease in income inequality in the developing country. In the long-
32run, both economies grow so welfare of workers in both countries improves. However, the
changes in the distribution of income from capital liberalization could persist if participation
rates in the stock markets do not change over time.
Solving the model for a lower, more realistic intertemporal elasticity of substitution for




To calibrate the process for productivity, annual measures of per worker GDP (yt) and
capital stock (kt) in constant international prices are available from Heston, Summers and
Aten (2002) database. The Solow residuals for country i = Korea,US come from
log(A
i
t)=l o g ( y
i
t) − αi log(k
i
t)
Data on capital output shares come from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Table 10.8 Panel
B).
After detrending the productivity time series using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter, the fol-
















33those AR(1) processes can be aproximated by a two-state markov chain in the following
way. If the transition matrix is
P =

 phh 1 − phh
1 − pll pll




















Given a value for π, this is a system of 4 equations in 4 unknowns that can be uniquely
solved to obtain the values of (logAh,logAl,p hh,p ll) for each country. For π =0 .737, 4
Korea:
logAh =0 .0117,logAl = −0.0327,p hh =0 .8877,p ll =0 .685
US:
4Following Hamilton (89)
34logAh =0 .0134,logAl = −0.0376,p hh =0 .9513,p ll =0 .864
Since full depreciation is assumed, the length of one period in the model is ten years.
Consequently all the parameters shown above are transformed in to their corresponding
ten-year analogous ones.
The annual rate of preference β is 0.94 for all agents in the model.
The relative average productivity between the two countries is obtained as the ratio
between   AUS and   AKorea,w h e r e












and TPF t =l o gyt − αlogkt is total factor productivity.
For a sample from 1965 until 1990,
e AKorea
e AUS =0 .972.
The participation rate in the stock market in US is assumed to be 20%, roughly consistent
with data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Although participation has increased,
particularly in the 90s, the Korean stock market was liberalized in 1987, and the stock wealth
is still very concentrated. Similar data for the Korean economy is not available, so the model
is calibrated for values of 10% (Case 1) and 20% (Case 2); 10% is a more likely value since
the US stock market is the most developed in the world, and those of other countries will
follow with a considerable lag.
The measure of stockholders in US is normalized to 1. Therefore, using population data



















Stock =0 .17,a n dµ
Korea
Wor =0 .69.
35Participation rates, together with data on stock of capital per worker in the data pin
down the relative levels of stock of capital per worker in the model for the year of the
liberalization of the Korean capital market. If the participation rate in the Korean stock













Steady state results for Case 1 are reported in the ﬁrst line of Table 1. The ﬁrst thing to
notice is that redistribution occurs mainly among stockholders.
Table 1. Eﬀects of liberalizing the capital account on expected lifetime
consumption (measured as a percentage change in annual consumption)
% of stockholders Initial Stockholders Workers
in Korea kus/kkorea US Korean US Korean
Steady state only
Case 1 10% 2.7 2.36% -7.42% -0.00% 0.58%
Case 1∗ 10% 1 1.36% -2.15% 0.00% 0.58%
Case 2 20% 2.3 1.27% -4.55% 0.00% 0.61%
Plus transition costs
Case 1 10% 2.7 0.89% -2.46% -0.25% 1.26%
For all cases the % of stockholders in US is 20%
The changes in stockholders’ welfare are of a much larger magnitude than the correspond-
ing changes experienced by workers. This was expected since national markets are segmented
36and only stockholders participate actively in the capital liberalization process. To under-
stand why US stockholders will be better oﬀ in the long run, while Korean stockholders
will not, we have to look at the steady state welfare that each representative stockholder
would enjoy under portfolio autarky, together with their relative initial wealth. It turns out
that even though average productivity in US is slightly higher than in Korea, the smaller
volatility of the Korean productivity shocks together with the smaller participation rates in
the stock market (or relatively smaller stockholder-worker ratio) would make Korean stock-
holders better oﬀ than US stockholders under the closed-economy case, this is,
LifetimeUtility
Closed ss
Stock Korea > LifetimeUtility
Closed ss
Stock US.
Therefore, when capital is freed up to move between countries, US stockholders will have the
chance to participate in the advantageous foreign technology, so they will be better oﬀ than
otherwise. On the contrary and in spite of the diversiﬁcation beneﬁts, Korean stockholders
will be worse oﬀ since the new technology they have access to, is relatively worse than the
o n et h e yh a v et oo ﬀer.
The exact changes in stockholders’ welfare are quite sensitive to their relative wealth at
the moment of the capital account liberalization since this ratio will also dictate their relative
wealth at the new steady state. In the second line of the table, the representative stockholders
of both countries are assumed to have the same wealth at the date of the liberalization (this
might be the case if free movement of capital is also accompanied by more availability of
foreign borrowing in the Korean markets), so the redistribution among stockholders is less
pronounced than before, though still important.
The other interesting feature shown in the ﬁrst two rows of the table refers to the dif-
ferences between the changes in welfare experienced by workers of every country. In other
words, why do workers in the country where labor is scarce in absolute terms (Korea) improve
more from the capital liberalization than do workers in the other country? As explained be-
fore, setting the intertemporal substitution of stockholders at 1, together with the concavity
37of the production functions, increase world wealth in the long run. But how much wealth
is invested in each country is particularly important in determining the welfare of workers.
Although diﬀerences in the relative levels of initial capital help determine the changes in
stockholders’ welfare in steady state, what matters most for workers’ changes in the long-
run welfare are the diﬀerences between the technology and the size of the two countries .
By looking at the calibrated parameters of the two economies, we observe that the features
of the two production functions, this is, their average productivity and the volatilities of
their technology shocks are not very diﬀerent, their participation rate in the stock market
could be (at least for the case where the participation rate in Korea is 10%), but the size of
the two countries is very diﬀerent. If two countries with identical technologies but diﬀerent
labor supply were left in portfolio autarky, the representative worker in every country would
attain the same lifetime welfare in steady state since stockholders of each country would
accumulate enough capital such that the capital-labor ratio in both countries would be the
same, although stockholders of the country where participation in the stock market is more
concentrated ( Korea in Case 1) will have accumulated more capital so they will consume
more and bear a larger volatility (just because their individual capital will be larger). How-
ever, when capital is allowed to move freely between the two countries, the diﬀerences in
risks due to the diﬀerent productive structure in each country, together with the proportion
of the world production provided by each country will support diﬀerent returns to capital
in equilibrium. In general capital will increase in the new steady state in both countries,
although it will increase relatively less or it may slightly decrease (as in the calibration) in
the country that produces the larger proportion of the world production.
Results for Case 2 are shown in the third row of Table 1. The line of the arguments
provided before still applies. It is worth noticing that the gains for US stockholders are
smaller than in Case 1 though still very signiﬁcant. This occur because Korean technology
provides a good investment opportunity for US stockholders, but not as good as in Case 1
(now the amount of labor available in Korea is 0.69 compare to the previous 0.77).
38When transition paths are included in the computation of welfare changes (see last row
of Table 1), two main trends can be noticed: First of all, redistribution between stockholders
is not as strong as before, and second, redistribution between workers grows.
US stockholders can take full advantage of the Korean technology only when the economy
is already in the new steady state. This is also the time when Korean stockholders lose the
maximun because of the sharing of their technology. Therefore when transition is taken into
account, the gains of US stockholders fall compared to the steady state computation, while
the loses of Korean stockholders partially recover.
The ﬂood of capital invested in the Korean economy coming from US stockholders ac-
celerate the accumulation of capital in Korea favoring their workers relatively more in the
short run. By the same token, US workers lose relatively more, and also in absolute terms,
when including the transition tours the new steady state. During the transition, either in
the closed or open capital account case, the volatility of wages are higher than their corre-
sponding steady state values. Moreover, volatilities in the closed-economy transition diﬀer
from those in the freed-capital one (as also do in the diﬀerent steady states), but even in the
transition, changes in the average dominate changes in the volatility.
6 Conclusions and extensions
This paper has examined the redistribution that takes place not only among countries but
also among diﬀerent groups within countries from opening the capital markets internation-
ally. In order to provide some insights into the beneﬁts of liberalization, and in contrast to
earlier studies, we have emphasized as a key feature the presence of heterogeneity among
nationals in their access to capital markets.
The main conclusion of the paper is that in the long run, for most of the parametrizations
workers are better oﬀ, while if one takes into account the transition (or the short-run eﬀects)
following liberalization, workers of some of the countries involved may be worse oﬀ.M o r e o v e r ,
39this paper shows that, at least from a long-run perspective, there does not need to be a
conﬂict in interest between stockholders and workers.
Liberalizing a country’s capital markets per se has redistribution eﬀects between agents
within that country, and also between countries. Furthermore, the free mobility of capital
is likely to aﬀect tax revenues. The model presented here is rich enough to provide some
insights about the eﬀects on redistribution under capital account liberalizations; at the same
time, it is suﬃciently simple to allow us to include taxation in the problem. Recent work
by Mendoza and Tesar (2003), Quadrini (2003), and Klein, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2003)
studies the changes in taxation over time associated with changes in the degree of capital
mobility among countries. The aim of those studies is to assess the welfare consequences
of tax competition under free capital mobility. A version of the present model with taxes
would enrich the representative-agent setups employed in the above-mentioned papers by
allowing us to investigate the interplay between inequality between agents in a country and
tax competition. Tax competition may have very diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent groups, and it
is also possible that the presence of incomplete (participation in) national ﬁnancial markets
can inﬂuence the aggregate welfare comparisons between systems with tax competition and
systems with tax coordination.
7 Appendix
7.1 Intercepts of the stockholder’s value function in a closed econ-
omy
ch cl solve the system of two equations:
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40for i = h,l and j = h,l.
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7.2 Derivation of the optimal policy rules for the stockholder un-
der incomplete markets
The problem of stockholder with wealth ω w h e nw o r l dw e a l t hi sωto and domestic and foreign
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41For the logarithmic utility and the Cobb-Douglas production function with full depreci-




























































guessing the next functional form for the policy rules:
k
  = λijω
k
∗  = λ
∗
ijω,
and plugging those in the FOCs above, we get
1





























































so the FOCs simplify to:
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those were the FOC’s for the stockholder when the two-country shocks were (Ai,A ∗
j),s o
we would have another six equations for pairs (Ai,A ∗
i), (Aj,A ∗
i),a n d(Aj,A ∗
j), so in total we
are left with eight unknowns and eight equations that do not depend on wealth.









In order to prove this claim, we just have to show that if λij = λ and λ
∗
ij = β − λ solve












































































and plugging Equation (2) in Equation (3) and using the fact that a+b+c+d =1 ,E q u a t i o n
(2) is also satisﬁed so the claim is true.
7.3 The i.i.d. case
As we just saw, when the country-speciﬁc shocks follow general transition probability ma-
trices, we can say that, given the current realization of the shocks (Ai,A ∗
j),i ft h eo p t i m a l
propensity to invest in the domestic asset is λij, then the optimal propensity to invest in the
foreign asset is (β − λij). Apart from that, we cannot obtain a closed-form solution for the
relationship among the optimal propensities to invest in the domestic asset for the diﬀerent
states, this is, λij, λii, λji,a n dλjj.
When both, home and foreign country shocks are i.i.d., current shocks do not give us any
information about the future, apart from the one already included in today’s wealth, and
therefore the propensity to invest in an asset from current wealth should be equal for any
realizations of the shocks. In this case, the four equations that determine λij, λii, λji,a n d

















where y is production in the domestic country and y∗ is production in the foreign country.
7.4 Derivation of the coeﬃcients of the value functions under in-
complete markets
Proposed guess for the value function of a stockholder with wealth ω w h e nw o r l dw e a l t hi s




j,ω,ωto)=aij + bij log(ω)+cij log(ωto);
substituting the optimal rule:
V (Ai,A
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αl
∗1−α],
a n ds oo nf o rzy = hh,hl,lh,a n dll. Substituting those in the above value function and

















jy[azy + bzylogω +( α(czy + bzy) − bzy)logωto +( bzy + czy)log(hzy)],
for ij = hh,hl,lh,a n dll. With this system of equations in the unknown coeﬃcients, we
obtain that
bij = bcap = 1
1−β > 0, ∀i ∀j and cij = ccap =
β(α−1)
(1−β)(1−αβ) < 0,∀i ∀j and aii, aij, ,a ji,a n d
ajj solve system of four independent equations (available upon request), that comes from
equating the terms that do not multiply either logω or logωto in the above expressions of
the value functions.
Now we proceed to derive the value function for the workers of the domestic country (the
derivation for the workers of the foreign country would be analogous).
Proposed guess for the value function of a domestic worker whose country’s wealth is ωd
, when world wealth is ωto , and domestic and foreign current shocks are (Ai,A ∗
j):
V (Ai,A ∗
j,ωd,ωto)=  aij +  bij log(ωd)+  cij log(ωto),
V (Ai,A
∗
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zyd = R 
z(λijωto)=α[Az(λijωto)αl1−α],for pairs zy = hh,hl,lh,a n dll.
Substituting those expressions in the workers’ value functions together with the expres-
sions for tomorrow’s total wealth for the diﬀerent states, we get:
V (Ai,A
∗








jy[  azy+α(  bzy+  czy)logωto+(  bzy+  czy)log(hzy)].
46And proceeding analogously for V (Ai,A ∗
i,ωd,ωto),V(Aj,A ∗
i,ωd,ωto),a n dV (Aj,A ∗
j,ωd,ωto)
we can solve for the unknown coeﬃcients such that.
  bii =  bij =   bji =   bjj = bwor =1> 0, and
  cii =   cij =   cji =   cjj = cwor =
βα
(1−βα) > 0.
And   aii,   aij, ,  aji,a n d  ajj solve system of four independent equations (available upon
request), that comes from equating the terms that do not multiply either logωd or logωto in
the above expressions of the workers’ value function.
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